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PRYING OPEN THE CLUBHOUSE DOOR:
DEFINING THE "DISTINCTLY PRIVATE" CLUB AFTER
NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION V CITY
OF NEW YORK
The door to the inner sanctum of the venerable private club recently
opened a crack, allowing entrance to women, long excluded from mem-
bership. The United States Supreme Court in New York State Club Asso-
ciation v. City of New York' held constitutional an ordinance2 that
restricted the scope of the "private club" exemption of New York City's
public accommodation law3 and thereby prohibited the exclusion of wo-
men from membership in certain private clubs. The Court recognized
that in some circumstances a compelling state interest in eradicating in-
vidious discrimination justifies interference with an individual's right of
association.4 New York State Club, however, did not define a "distinctly
private"5 club, and, therefore, left open the question of when a private
club might discriminate in order to protect the right of association.6 The
1. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
2. Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, app. 14-15, quoted in New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at
2230-31.
3. This ordinance amended the city's Human Rights Law, which prohibits discrimination
based on race, creed, color, national origin, or sex by "any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement." N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2) (1986). The Human Rights Law covers such places
as hotels, restaurants, retail stores, hospitals, laundries, theaters, parks, public conveyances, and
public halls. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). The law also exempts from its coverage
various public educational facilities and "any institution, club or place of accommodation which
proves that it is in its nature distinctly private." Id.
The Supreme Court in New York State Club recognized that "[t]he basic purpose of the amend-
ment is to prohibit discrimination in certain private clubs that are determined to be sufficiently
'public' in nature that they do not fit properly within the [private club exemption]." New York State
Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. The amended private club exemption provides:
An institution, club or place of public accommodation shall not be considered in its nature
distinctly private if it has more than 400 members, provides regular meal service and regu-
larly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages
directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or
business ....
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
4. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
5. See supra note 2.
6. The Supreme Court has failed to resolve this issue on more than one occasion. In Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), the Court held simply that Minnesota's public accom-
modation law-by compelling acceptance of women as members-did not infringe on Jaycees mem-
bers' freedom of intimate association or freedom of expressive association guaranteed under the first
amendment. It did not answer how far a statute or ordinance could go in such a requirement.
Washington University Open Scholarship
372 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 68:371
opinion suggests, nonetheless, that the Court is willing to defer to states'
good faith efforts to define the "private club."
This Note will examine the conflict between the first amendment right
of freedom of association and the right of freedom from discrimination.
Part I discusses the role of private clubs in the United States. Part II
reviews the first amendment right of association. Part III examines the
state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination and the Supreme
Court's analysis of state public accommodation laws in the private club
context. Part IV looks at judicial approaches to identifying the private
club and proposes that states adopt a four-part analysis for defining the
private club.
I. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE CLUB
While civil rights legislation may have aided in providing minorities
and women equal access to housing and jobs, 8 subtle, invidious discrimi-
nation continues in the United States today.9 Lawmakers and judges
Similarly, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), the Court
stated that it had "no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and other entities with selectivqr,
membership that are found throughout the country." Id. at 547 n.6.
7. While the freedom of association receives constitutional protection from the first amend-
ment, see infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text, the freedom from discrimination does not, unless
a court finds that state action exists. This requirement lies in the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment: "nor shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX, § 1. See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Court
found no state action satisfying the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and therefore
did not reach the issue of when a private club is constitutionally barred from discriminating). As a
result of this dichotomy, the smaller a club is, the more likely it will be able both to claim the right to
associate and to avoid the duty of equal protection. The issue this Note addresses is when the state
can impose its own equal protection law-a nondiscrimination law--on private clubs without inter-
fering with their constitutional right to associate.
8. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (1982); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2(a)-(d) (1982).
9. This Note focuses on the problem of sex discrimination in private clubs. This is not to deny
that discrimination based on race and religion continues in this country. However, as one commen-
tator observed:
The same men who have brought male Jewish leaders into their clubs as members, and
who would be appalled if Black male colleagues whom they invited to their clubs as guests
were directed to enter through a side door or barred from walking on the stairs, view with
equanimity and frequently vote to perpetuate both the exclusion of women as members and
their second-class treatment as guests.
L. SCHAFRAN, WELCOME TO THE CLUB! (No WOMEN NEED APPLY): REMOVING FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FROM PRIVATE CLUBS THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN 4-5 (1981). See also
Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 418 (1977) ("Those 'sacred' men's
bars and lunchrooms are the embodiment of a strong idea: that discrimination on the ground of sex
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have recognized race discrimination as a social evil and have taken steps
toward its eradication; but they have done far less to erase sex discrimi-
nation.10 In the United States today, prohibitions of race discrimination
in public accommodations without counterpart prohibitions of sex dis-
crimination exist at the federal"' and state level, 2 as well as within most
is reasonable even natural-not as harmful, somehow, as racial or religious bias.") (quoting Harkins,
Sex and the City Council, N.Y. MAG., April 27, 1970 at 10).
10. See, e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1982) (prohibiting
race but not sex discrimination in any place of public accommodation). The Supreme Court treats
state classification by race as "suspect" and therefore subject to strict scrutiny judicial review. See,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Sex discrimination, on the other hand, receives at best
intermediate scrutiny judicial review by the Court. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Perhaps not coincidentally, many lawmakers and judges belong to private clubs that exclude women.
Two justices of the United States Supreme Court only recently resigned from all-male clubs. When
he became a candidate for the Supreme Court, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy resigned from the
Olympic Club in San Francisco and the Del Paso Country Club in Sacramento. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1987, at A26, col.1. Justice Harry A. Blackmun resigned from the Cosmos Club in the District of
Columbia in February 1988. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1988, at B6, col.l. The Cosmos Club since has
voted to admit women. St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 28, 1988, at Al, col.2.
As one commentator noted, "[i]f a Federal judge with life tenure is unwilling through his private
conduct to condemn... discrimination, others cannot be expected to do so." Bums, The Exclusion
of Women from Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 404 (1983) (quoting Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges.
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 253, 328 (appendix on
discrimination in private clubs) (statement of Professor Eric Schnapper)).
For a thorough discussion of steps to eradicate sex discrimination, see Bums, supra, who
recommends:
[T]hese "social" clubs should not be exempted from public accommodation laws. Nor
should they be exempted from state and local regulations barring discrimination. They
should not receive tax exemptions, and members should not be permitted to deduct club
charges as business expenses. Employers who reimburse employees at discriminatory clubs
should be subject to employment discrimination legislation, and the clubs themselves ought
to be liable for aiding and abetting such discrimination. Finally, club members should be
encouraged to take voluntary action, both individually and collectively to combat
discrimination.
Id. at 324-25.
11. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1982). The absence of sex from the list stands in sharp contrast to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
Federal legislation may impose on public accommodations that either affect commerce or are
supported by state action. The state action requirement has been a significant obstacle to the appli-
cation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to clubs. See, eg., New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1975) (no state action despite receipt of substantial government
funding). For a detailed discussion of equal protection and state action, see infra note 66.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects against sex discrimination in employment. See 42
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state constitutions. 13 This situation suggests that discrimination against
women remains legally and socially acceptable.
The right to be free from discrimination in social, business, and polit-
ical settings should stand as a hallmark of equality.14 Many business,
service, and social clubs across the country, however, continue to exclude
women from membership. 5 The denial of access to women may perpet-
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). For a discussion of Title VII's interrelation with state regulations and its
effect on employment discrimination in private clubs, see Garcia, Title VII Does Not Preempt State
Regulation of Private Club Employment Practices, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1107 (1983). See also Guesby
v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Kan. 1984) (right of association more limited in employ-
ment context than in membership context); Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
187 Cal. App. 3d 1, 231 Cal. Rptr. 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (social clubs not exempt from Fair
Employment and Housing Act; male gender not bona fide occupational qualification).
12. Twelve states do not proscribe sex discrimination in places of public accommodation. Of
these, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Vir-
ginia have no law prohibiting discrimination in public places based on race, religion or sex. For a list
of state statutes banning sex discrimination in places of public accommodation, see infra note 70,
13. Only sixteen states have passed some form of equal rights amendment. See ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. If, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; HAwAII CONST. art. I,
§ 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 118; MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XLVI; MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. I; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 11, art. II; N.M. CONsT. art. II, § 18; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3 a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § a; Wyo. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; id., art. VI, § 1. Only these amend-
ments, interpreted as not requiring state action, would apply to public accommodations.
14. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsmuST 87-88 (1980) (advocating judicial decisions that
facilitate the representation of minorities in the political process); Bums, supra note 10, at 321-22
(discrimination in employment setting shatters aspirations and produces incomplete lives); Goodwin,
Challenging the Private Club: Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 3 Sw. U.L. 237, 271
(1982) (deprivation of right to participate fully in certain institutions diminishes self-image); cf.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (separation of blacks in education negatively
affects their self-image and achievement).
15. See generally Bums, supra note 10, at 323. However, some associations have opened their
doors to women voluntarily. Two days before the New York State Club decision, the Washington,
D.C., Cosmos Club voted to end its 110-year male-only membership policy. St. Louis Post Dis-
patch, June 28, 1988, at Al, col. 2. The Lions Club, the Kiwanis Club, the California Club in Los
Angeles, the University Clubs of Pasadena, California, and Providence, Rhode Island, Philadelphia's
Union League, and the Detroit Athletic Club all have voted to admit women. N.Y. Times, July 16,
1987, at 13, col.l. See also St. Louis Post Dispatch, Sept. 17, 1988, at Al, col.2 (St. Louis' Missouri
Athletic Club voted to admit women members, ending its 85-year male-only policy).
Many of the oldest and most influential clubs, however, have refused to follow the trend toward
opening access to private clubs. The Bohemian Club filed suit to enjoin enforcement of California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act. Kay, Commentary: Private Clubs and Private Interests: A View from San
Francisco, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 855 (1989). Many clubs moved to "privatize" by changing club policies
so as to avoid the reach of antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 858. For example, clubs try to preserve
their private status by refusing corporate checks for payment and limiting the number of guests. Id.
Even after admitting women members, clubs may not accept them very congenially. For example, at
one influential San Francisco club, in response to a judge's order that the club cease its discrimina-
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uate a societal view of their inferiority to men.6 More immediately, ex-
clusion of women from business-oriented clubs impedes women from
gaining equal opportunities in commercial and community activities.17
Through these powerful clubs, men make valuable business, political and
financial contacts. 8 Further, some clubs appear to be training grounds
for new government and corporate leaders.19 Exclusion of women from
membership in private clubs, therefore, effectively forecloses opportuni-
ties for business and professional advancement and community
leadership.20
Ii. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The private club debate presents a quandary: the exercise by some of
tory practices regarding facilities, several male members demonstrated their opposition by swimming
nude in the club's newly coed pool. Id. at 860.
16. One commentator noted that exclusion from these informal centers of power "reinforces
the perception that women are not appropriate participants where formal power is exercised." Scha-
fran, supra note 9, at 3-4 (quoting Karen Burstein, former New York State Senator and Public
Service Commissioner). Schafran went on to assert that private club discrimination "negatively in-
fluences the acceptance of women by men as peers and colleagues." Id. at 5. See also supra note 14.
17. The New York City Council recognized this problem when it amended the city's Human
Rights Law:
Although city, state and federal laws have been enacted to eliminate discrimination in
employment, women and minority group members have not attained equal opportunity in
business and the professions. One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in
the business and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain mem-
bership organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable
for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed.
Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, app. 14-15, quoted in New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230 (1988).
18. Bums, supra note 10, at 325-34.
"To the extent that club membership results in tangible professional benefits, such as enhanced
professional status, mobility and contacts, would-be members are denied economic and employment
interests." Goodwin, supra note 14, at 270.
19. See Note, supra note 9, at 419-20 & n.10 (listing members of one private club and their high
positions in the corporate and government sectors).
20. See E. LYNTON, BEHIND CLOSED DooRs: DISCRIMINATION BY PRIVATE CLUBS: A RE-
PORT BASED ON CITY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHT HEARINGS 3 (1975). See also Kay, supra
note 15, at 859.
Recognizing the value of "networking," some business and professional women have founded
their own clubs. Most encourage men to join because "[m]en often are the ones with the connec-
tions." Boughton, Club Connections, WORKING WOMAN, Jan. 1984, at 43. Some clubs, such as the
Women's Athletic Club in Boston, exclude men from membership. See Bums, supra note 10, at 332
n.35. Although the legality or constitutionality of regulating such clubs is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is likely that membership policies of all-female organizations would be analyzed differently
from the policies of all-male organizations. See generally Feldblum, Krent, & Watkins, Legal Chal-
lenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 171 (1986).
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the club's constitutional right of association21 clashes with individuals'
rights to be free from discrimination.22 Club members argue that the
first amendment right of association carries with it a negative right not to
associate.23 But those excluded from membership argue that discrimina-
tory membership policies burden their ability to achieve prominence in
their professional lives.24
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of free-
dom of association, the Supreme Court has held it derives by implication
from the first amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, press,
assembly, and petition.25 Within the freedom of association, the Court
has recefitly distinguished the right to intimate association and the right
to expressive association,26 as well as recognized a corresponding right
21. For an analysis of a private club's right of association, see Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545-49 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
618 (1984). For a detailed discussion of freedom of association and discrimination in private clubs,
see Note, Discrimination in Private Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 1181 [hereinafter Note, Private Social Clubs]. See generally Note, Association, Privacy and the
Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460 (1970) [hereinafter Note,
Constitutional Conflict].
22. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. See generally New York State Club Ass'n v.
City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234-35 (1988); Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545; Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 617, 627.
The associational rights which our system honors permits all white, all black, all brown
and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all Agnostic
clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associ-
ates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoted with
approval in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1964)
(right of association is necessary to make meaningful first amendment's express guarantees).
26. The Supreme Court recognizes two aspects of the right of association. First, the Court
considers a right of intimate association as connected to the fundamental right to privacy. See infra
notes 46, 47 and accompanying text. The Court views the family as exemplary of the type of associa-
tion protected by this right. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Second,
the Court recognizes a right of expressive association, which entitles individuals to associate to pur-
sue goals that the first amendment expressly and independently protects. Id. See infra notes 37-45
and accompanying text.
, For further discussion of the right of association, see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 947-52 (3d ed. 1986). These authors identify a third type of associ-
ation-the right of economic association. Individuals might join together to achieve economic or
other goals unconnected to any fundamental constitutional right. The ability to control one's eco-
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not to associate.z7 The Court, however, is reluctant to construe broadly
the right of freedom not to associate.28
The Court formally recognized a constitutional right of freedom of
association more than thirty years ago in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson.2 9 The Court acknowledged that the freedom to associate for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty
protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.30
In Patterson, Alabama demanded that the NAACP disclose the names
and addresses of all its members in the state.3" The NAACP showed that
past disclosure had led to public hostility, threats, and loss of jobs to its
members.32 The Court found the state's interest in forcing the NAACP
to disclose membership not sufficiently compelling to justify infringement
on the members' freedom of association. 33 The Court emphasized that
an organization has a right to assert, on behalf of its members, the same
first amendment rights as the members themselves may assert.34 Fur-
ther, the Court held that privacy 35 in group association often may be
nomic associations is part of the liberty protected by due process. Id. See infra notes 37-45 and
accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
28. For example, "forced associations" must occur in public places. See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Some forced associations
are inevitable in an industrial society. One who of necessity rides buses and street cars does not have
the freedom that John Muir and Walt Whitman extolled.").
29. 357 U.S. 449 (1959).
30. Id. at 460-61.
31. Id. at 451.
32. Id. at 462.
33. The Court distinguished the NAACP from an organization with illegal ends, such as that in
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). In Bryant, the Court upheld a New York state require-
ment of disclosure of the membership roster of all unincorporated associations, which required an
oath as a condition to membership, as applied to the Ku Klux Klan. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 465-
66.
The Patterson Court struck a balance between the state's interest in obtaining the names of the
NAACP's members and the members' right of freedom of association. The Court found that the
State failed to show a compelling justification for the likely deterrent effect of disclosure on the free
enjoyment of the right to associate. Id. at 460-66.
34. Id. at 459.
35. The "right to privacy" varies in meaning. Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965), found the "penumbras" of several express guarantees of the Bill of Rights
established a right to privacy. Specific provisions of the Constitution that support the right to pri-
vacy include: the first amendment (freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly, and right to
petition the government); the third amendment (prohibiting quartering of militia); the fourth amend-
ment (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); the fifth amendment (freedom from forced
self-incrimination); and the ninth amendment (retention by the people of rights not delegated). Id.
Under the common law, the right of privacy encompasses a freedom from intrusion by others into
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"indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs."36
A. Expressive Association
Expressive association, as protected in Patterson, is a necessary avenue
for pursuing activities expressly protected by the first amendment. 37
First amendment values such as "an individual's freedom to speak, to
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances"
risk state interference unless the Constitution guarantees "a correlative
freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends."' 38 The Court thus
must recognize a group right to associate freely for expressive purposes
to protect fully an individual's freedom of expression.39
The government, however, may infringe on the right to associate for
expressive purposes in certain circumstances.' First, regulations must
serve compelling state interests unrelated to the suppression of ideas.41
Second, means "significantly less restrictive" toward associational free-
doms must be unavailable.42 The Supreme Court in New York State
Club recognized that a regulation prohibiting sex discrimination may sat-
isfy the requirement of a compelling state interest.4 3 Courts then will
privately owned areas and from disclosures about an individual's private life. See Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
36. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
37. Id. at 460-61. "Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view ... is undenia-
bly enhanced by group association." Id. at 460.
38. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 623. Some argue, on the other hand, that the right of free speech is absolute. Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the First Amendment
[contains an] unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech
.... "). This view arises from the Supreme Court's assertion that certain rights might properly
receive more active judicial protection. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-
53 n.4 (1938). The Court later declared: "Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion
are in a preferred position." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Compare U.S.
CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law .... ) (emphasis added) with U.S. CoNST. amend.
IV (prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures") (emphasis added). Although Justices Black and
Douglas championed an absolutist view of free speech, a majority of the Court has never explicitly
adopted it. Instead, the Court apparently takes a "balancing view." See, e.g., Konigsberg, 366 U.S.
at 49-51, 56 (Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, presents justification for judicial balancing, with
Black and Douglas dissenting).
41. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
42. Id. Cf New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988)
(focus on overbreadth of state law).
43. Id. at 2234.
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examine the specific regulation at issue to determine whether its means
are too restrictive4" or whether it is overbroad.45
B. Intimate Association
The right of intimate association protects personal liberties such as the
right to marry, the right to bear children, and the right to educate and
raise one's children.46 For an organization to invoke the right of intimate
association it must exhibit some of the characteristics of family relations:
"the group must be small, selective and exclude outsiders from 'critical
aspects of the relationship.' "47
C. Right Not to Associate
The right to associate implies a right not to associate.4" The Supreme
Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education49 recognized that an indi-
vidual has a constitutional right not to be coerced to support, financially
or otherwise, an organization's expressive activities to which she ob-
jects." The Abood Court stated that first amendment principles allow
individuals the freedom to believe what they will and require that, in a
free society, individuals' minds and consciences should shape their be-
liefs without coercion by the state.5 1
Once the federal government or a state enacts antidiscrimination legis-
44. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-28 (absence of showing that state law imposed "serious bur-
dens on the male members' freedom of expressive association").
45. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2234-35 (case-by-case analysis).
46. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (cohabitation with family members); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (education and childrearing).
47. Feldblum, Krent & Watkins, supra note 20, at 191 n.87 (1986) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 620 (1984)). The Jaycees, with 295,000 members, composed of all men between the ages of 18 and
35, did not qualify for a right of intimate association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
48. Roberts, 468 U.S. 623 ("Freedom of association.., plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (constitutionally protected
right of "refusing to associate").
49. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
50. Id. at 233-35. In Abood, a public school board required employees who did not join the
union to pay a "service fee" equal to union dues. Id. at 211. The Court held that a union's expendi-
tures for ideological causes unrelated to its duties as a collective-bargaining representative must be
financed by employees who do not object to advancing those causes. Id. at 235-36. The union could
properly use the fees to finance expenditures for collective bargaining, contract administration and
grievance adjustment purposes. The Court distinguished the improper uses of the fee as not germane
to the union's duties as collective bargaining representative. Id. at 225, 232-37.
51. Id. at 234-35. These principles, the Court held, prohibit the state from requiring employees
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lation, an organization may argue that the right not to associate equates
to a first amendment right to exclude unwanted members.52 This as-
serted "right to exclude" is not without limitation. The exclusion must
be in furtherance of a first amendment right to associate, be it expressive
or intimate.5 3 Thus, to exercise the right to exclude despite the legis-
lation, clubs must assert more than an arbitrary right to discriminate.54
In contexts where associational rights do not exist, the Court explicitly
has refused affirmative constitutional protection for invidious private
discrimination."
A valid freedom of association right will act as a shield from state
interference for distinctly private clubs. The public nature of certain
clubs, however, distinguishes them from genuinely private associational
relationships. Because the Constitution does not provide an unrestricted
right of association,56 states may proscribe sex discrimination in clubs
that are not distinctly private. The difficulty lies in how states ultimately
identify which clubs are "distinctly private."
to contribute to support an ideological cause they may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a
public school employee. Id. at 234-36.
52. See, eg., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987); Roberts, 468 U.S. at
473.
53. See, eg., New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
54. The Court in Roberts states that it has "long understood as implicit in the right to partici-
pate in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends." 468
U.S. at 622.
55. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). In Hishon, the Court held that the constitu-
tional rights of expression and association do not preclude application of Title VII guarantees to the
decision to grant partnership status to an associate in a law firm, where partnership consideration
otherwise qualifies as a term, condition or privilege of employment.
In Norwood, the Court stated that "the Constitution... places no value on discrimination." 413
U.S. at 470. "Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom
of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative consti-
tutional protections." Id.
In Runyon, the Court held that under the recognized principle of a right "to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," parents have a right to send their children to schools that
promote racial segregation and that the children have a right to attend such schools. 427 U.S. at
175-76 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1959)). The Patterson
principle, however, does not protect the practice of excluding racial minorities. Id. at 176.
56. See supra notes 40, 53-55 and accompanying text.
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III. FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION: PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION LAWS
States enact public accommodation laws pursuant to their compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination. 7 Yet these laws commonly pro-
vide an exemption for private clubs.5" Most statutes, however, fail to
define "distinctly private" clubs,59 leaving unresolved the question of
which clubs legitimately may refuse to accept women as members.
A. Federal Antidiscrimination Law
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly exempts private clubs
from its prohibition of race discrimination in places of "public accommo-
dation."'  The statute by its terms does not apply to "a private club or
other establishment not in fact open to the public."61 In failing to define
"private," the act leaves the term open to broad interpretation.62 Courts
have denied use of the exemption to organizations that claim private sta-
tus merely to assert a right to discriminate.63 The federal public accom-
57. See, eg., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623-25.
58. See infra note 71.
59. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(e) (1982). The federal law applies to discrimination based on race,
color, religion or national origin. Id. § 2000a(b).
61. Id. § 2000a(e). The exemption is limited "to the extent that the facilities of such establish-
ment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment" as defined in subsection
(b). Id.
62. One can verify the great room for interpretation by looking at one court's laundry list of
factors. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in United States v.
Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969), interpreted the legislative history as supplying relevant
inquiries as to whether a club is private. The court's analysis posed factual questions falling into six
categories: 1) whether the "membership is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis"; 2) "who
controls the operations of the establishment"; 3) "the purpose of the membership corporation"; 4)
the club's observed formalities; and 5) "general characteristics which many private clubs possess,"
such as advertising, tax-exempt status, and payment for services. Id. at 375-76. See also Cornelius v.
Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974) (factors for
deeming clubs private include selectivity of membership, guest policies, and business characteristics
of organization). Compare Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (2850-member,
all-white supper club held not private) with Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1191 n. 10 (two million-mem-
ber Elks club private).
63. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (swimming pool
association with membership open to every white person within a narrow geographic area was not a
private club exempt from Civil Rights Act); United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp.
90 (E.D. La. 1967) (restaurant with no real membership requirements except being "non-Negro, and
able to pay [the] bill" not a private club); Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md.
1966) (charging 25-cent annual membership fee for "pool club" does not convert tax-exempt facility
built largely with public funds into private club).
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modations law, however, does not prohibit sex discrimination.' 4
Furthermore, the lack of a well-defined test for determining whether a
club is private under the federal law suggests that courts will find it no
easier to define private clubs under analogous, sex-based state public ac-
commodations laws.
B. State Antidiscrimination Laws
The Supreme Court has characterized the Constitution as a floor be-
low which the states may not descend, and not as a ceiling which limits
states' attempts to eliminate discrimination.65 States thus may provide
protection against discrimination beyond that guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. Similarly, state laws may contain broader definitions of public
accommodations and more narrow exemptions for private clubs than
federal law.66 A state's compelling interest in preventing discrimination,
therefore, may justify further intrusion on the individual's right of associ-
ation.67 Many state and local laws prohibit sex discrimination despite
the federal law's failure to do so. 68
64. See supra note 60. See also Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp.
125-3, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (court denied motion of women's organization seeking to enjoin bar's
male-only policy); DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
Additionally, neither the Constitution nor existing federal statutes provide a recognized bar
against sex discrimination in private clubs. If no "state action" is found, courts will not reach the
merits of what equal protection requires in a given factual situation. See supra note 7 and accompa-
nying text. Some federal statutes, however, including the public accommodations law, are directed
explicitly at discriminatory private behavior. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 has reached some dis-
criminatory private behavior. This act was derived from the thirteenth amendment, which contains
no state action requirement. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). Courts,
however, have refused to apply § 1981 and § 1982 to private sex discrimination. Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976). Some courts have reached racially discriminatory private behavior
under § 1981 and § 1982. See, eg., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Jones, 392 U.S. 409.
65. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
66. The Supreme Court's analysis in the private club context suggests the Court will defer to
states' good-faith efforts to formulate definitions. See infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
67. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text. But cf Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92
(1982) (first amendment prohibits state from compelling campaign expense disclosures by minor
political party when disclosure would lead to threats, harassment or reprisals); Democratic Party of
the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981) (state's asserted compelling interest in
preserving overall integrity of electoral process did not justify substantial intrusion into associational
freedom of national political party).
68. Compare, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1402 (West 1987) (discrimination "because of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap") (emphasis added) and N.Y.C. ADMIN.
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Generally, state public accommodations laws closely parallel the pro-
visions of the federal public accommodations law.69 Forty states and the
District of Columbia ban sex discrimination in places of public accom-
modation.70 Of these, sixteen specifically exempt private clubs.71 Others
CODE § 8-107(2) (1986) (discrimination "because of the race, creed, color, national origin or sex of
any person") (emphasis added) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1982) (discrimination on ground of "race,
color, religion, or national origin"). Nonfederal laws often serve as the basis for challenges of dis-
criminatory membership policies of private clubs in state courts. See, eg., United State Jaycees v.
McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (Jaycees deemed place of public accommodation for pur-
poses of state statute).
69. Compare, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1990) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(e)
(1982).
70. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 4504 (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-241(a) (Supp. 1977-78); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.141
(West 1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301 to -7303 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-102 (1989);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7(l)(a) (West Supp. 1988);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(c)(1) (1986); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 49-146 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 4592 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1986 & Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
272, §§ 92A-98 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2302-2303, 750.146 (1985 &
West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.065
(Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-134 to 138
(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A: 8-IV (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, -1-7, -1-9, (Supp. 1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G)
(Anderson Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-02 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.670 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(i) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2
(1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-23 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to -7-3 (1986 & Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (Supp. 1989);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-6 (Supp. 1987); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 942-04 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); WYO. STAT. § 6-9-101 (1988).
Some cities, too, have stepped in to prohibit sex discrimination by local law. Like New York City,
San Francisco passed a law banning discrimination in clubs "not distinctly private." Kay, supra
note 13, at 857 (quoting SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. CODE art. 33B (1987)). The law defines a
club as not distinctly private if it has more than 400 members, provides regular meal service, and
regularly accepts payment from nonmembers. Id.
For a thorough review of state and federal public accommodation laws, see Note, Discrimination
in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (Spring 1978).
71. The following jurisdictions exempt private clubs from their public accommodation laws:
the District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. For
example, Michigan's law provides:
[t]his article shall not apply to a private club, or other establishment not in fact open to the
public, except to the extent that the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of the private club or establishment are made available to the customers
or patrons of another establishment that is a place of accommodation or is licensed by the
state ....
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do not mention private clubs explicitly but exempt "distinctly private"
accommodations. 72 Few of the state laws, however, define "private" or
"private club.",73
State public accommodations laws that do define private club focus on
membership selectivity and the degree of exclusion of nonmembers from
club facilities.74 Oklahoma's statute, for example, provides that "a pri-
vate club is not a place of public accommodation if its policies are deter-
mined by its members and its facilities or services are available only to its
members and their bona fide guests."75
Only Louisiana's law explicitly identifies factors for determining
whether an organization is a private club.76 Those factors are: 1) selec-
tiveness of the group in adding new members; 2) existence of formal
membership procedures; 3) membership governance; 4) history of the or-
ganization; 5) use of club facilities by nonmembers; 6) substantiality of
dues; 7) advertisement of the organization; and 8) predominance of a
profit motive. 7  While these factors may help determine whether an or-
ganization is in fact private,7 8 they are not as specific as the standards set
forth in New York City's Human Rights Law.79
New York City's law is unusual in that it defines what does not consti-
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2303 (West 1985).
New Mexico's Human Rights Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -1-15 (Supp. 1987) defines
"public accommodation" as "any establishment that provides or offers its services, facilities, accom-
modations or goods to the public, but does not include a bona fide private club or other place or
establishment which is by its nature and use distinctly private." Id. § 28-1-2(H) (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (Purdon Supp. 1988) (simply exempting "any
accommodations which are in their nature distinctly private").
73. A typical state law is the Oregon statute, which provides that "a place of accommodation
does not include any institution, bona fide club or place of accommodation which is in its nature
distinctly private." OR. REV. STAT. § 30.680(2) (Supp. 1987). The Oregon law, however, fails to
define "bona fide" or "private club." See id. See also, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2303
(West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -1-15 (Supp. 1987).
74. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 49: 146(3) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401(l)(i) (west
1987). Selectivity and exclusion of nonmembers are important indicators of the degree of intimate
association present in a particular club. For a more thorough discussion of these factors, see infra
notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
75. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401(l)(i) (West 1987) (emphasis added).
76. LA. REv. STAT. § 49:146(3) (1987).
77. Id.
78. See infra notes 122-56 and accompanying text. The first three factors of Louisiana's statute
indicate the degree of the club's selectivity, exclusion of nonmembers, and purpose. Use of club
facilities by nonmembers indicates the club's exclusivity. Substantiality of dues and advertising show
both selectivity and exclusion of nonmembers. The club's history and the predominance of a profit
motive may indicate a commercial purpose.
79. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(9), 8-107(2) (1986). See supra note 2.
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tute a "private club." According to the ordinance, the following shall
not be considered distinctly private:
any institution, club or place of accommodation [that] has more than four
hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives pay-
ment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages di-
rectly or indirectly or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade
or business. 80
The lack of such an express definition in most state statutes, however,
leaves unanswered the question of when purportedly private clubs legiti-
mately may discriminate against women.
IV. DEFINING THE PRIVATE CLUB
A. The Supreme Court Framework
The Supreme Court first established a framework to determine which
clubs are exempt from state public accommodations laws in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees."' In Roberts, the United States Jaycees argued
that Minnesota's Human Rights Act, 2 which prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in public accommodations, 8 3 unconstitutionally impinged upon its
members' first amendment right of association. 4 The Court upheld the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to interpret "public accommoda-
tion" so broadly as to prohibit the United States Jaycees from discrimi-
nating against women in membership selection. 5
80. Id.
81. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
82. Roberts involves state regulation that goes beyond federal constitutional requirements.
Minnesota included sex discrimination within the prohibitions of its public accommodation law.
MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1982), construed in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615. See supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
83. The act provided in pertinent part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of
public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or
sex.
MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1982), quoted in Roberts, 468 U.S. 614-15.
The act defined "place of public accommodation" as "a business, accommodation, refreshment,
entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or
otherwise made available to the public." MINN. STAT. § 363.01, quoted in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
The Roberts Court noted that the Minnesota statute provided "a functional definition of public ac-
commodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct." 468 U.S. at 625
(citations omitted).
84. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-17.
85. Id. at 629-31. The Minnesota court found the Jaycees to be a place of public accommoda-
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Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan suggested a continuum upon
which the right of freedom of association would receive varying degrees
of constitutional protection.86 As the group's size increases and its selec-
tivity decreases, the amount of constitutional protection it receives di-
minishes." The Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota court's finding88
that the Jaycees' activities were substantially open to nonmembers and
that the membership was too large and nonselective to warrant constitu-
tional protection of an intimate association right.8 9 The Court also
agreed that the state's compelling interest in assuring equal access to all
its citizens justified any infringement on the group's expressive rights.90
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to expand its freedom of asso-
ciation analysis in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte.9' In Rotary Club, Rotary International revoked the
charter of a local chapter, which had admitted women contrary to the
Rotary Constitution.92 The local club and two of its women members
filed suit alleging that the international organization's actions violated
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act,93 one of the broadest state public
tion. Id. The Supreme Court's acceptance of this finding and the difficulty of creating a bright-line
constitutional test in this area suggest that the Court may defer to state definitions of a private club.
86. Id. at 620. This analysis is analogous to Justice Marshall's sliding-scale approach for equal
protection review. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall,
J. dissenting). In Rodriguez, Marshall argued in favor of a "sliding scale" of review, whereby the
degree of scrutiny in equal protection cases would vary along a continuum depending on the impor-
tance of the interest at stake and the suspectness of the classification. Id. at 81-101. See also Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-620. See also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546-47.
88. The Court accepted Minnesota's good faith effort at line drawing in an area in which consti-
tutional standards are unclear. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20.
89. Id. at 620-21. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The Jaycees had approxi-
mately 295,000 members in 7,400 local chapters. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613. Men over age 35 and
women made up the Jaycees 11,915 associate members. Id. "Apart from age and sex, neither the
national organization nor the local chapters employ[ed] any criteria for judging applicants for mem-
bership .. ." Id. at 621.
90. Id. at 623. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. The Court found no basis to
conclude that admission of women as full-voting members would impede the Jaycees' expression on
political, economic, cultural, and social affairs. This was because nothing in the Jaycees' ideology
was based on sex. Id. at 626-27.
91. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
92. Id. at 541.
93. The Unruh Civil Rights Act states in pertinent part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of
this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp.
1987) (section 51 is known as the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
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accommodations laws.94
The California Court of Appeals found substantial business benefits95
from Rotary membership, and therefore held Rotary International to be
a "business establishment" within the meaning of the California statute.
The Supreme Court decided the act did not violate the club members'
associational rights.96 As in Roberts, the Court found the membership
too large and nonselective to assert the right of intimate association.9 7
Additionally, the Court found no evidence that the admission of women
would hamper the club's message, thereby violating the right to expres-
sive association.9"
The Court in Rotary Club did little to resolve the conflict between free-
dom of association and sex discrimination in private clubs.9 9 The Court
failed to define explicitly characteristics of private clubs or to establish
the boundaries of the right of association. Instead, the Court increased
the ambiguity by proposing that lower courts judge clubs on the "objec-
tive characteristics of the particular relationships at issue."'" Such a
proposal leaves both states and purportedly private clubs without gui-
dance in determining what activities are private.
The Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue, New York State
Club Association v. City of New York,10 1 suggests that states need not shy
away from more explicit legislative definitions of the private club. New
94. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 542. California has defined public accommodations broadly to
encompass "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering
Supp. 1987).
95. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 542-43.
96. Id. at 547.
97. When the case came to trial, Rotary International consisted of 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157
countries, with a total membership of about 907,750. Id. at 540. Local clubs admit members ac-
cording to a "classification system" designed to represent "all business, professional and institutional
activities in the community." Id. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. The Court found that, "as a matter of pol-
icy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions on 'public questions,'" Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548, and
that the Unruh Act did not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of their service activities that
are protected by the first amendment. Id.
99. We have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which the First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs and other entities with
selective membership that are found throughout the country. Whether the "zone of pri-
vacy" established by the First Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a
careful inquiry into the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at issue.
Id. at 548 n.6 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 548 n.6.
101. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). For a general discussion of the case, see Comment, Redefining the
Private Club: New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 36 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 249 (1989).
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York City amended its Human Rights Law to prohibit discrimination in
clubs that are not "distinctly private."' 2 The law essentially sets out a
three-prong test to determine which clubs meet the definition of private.
Under the city's ordinance, a club is not private if it has more than 400
members, provides regular meal service, and receives regular payment
from nonmembers.10 3 The ordinance specifically deems benevolent or-
ders and religious corporations "distinctly private."' °4
The New York State Club Association (NYSCA) challenged the ordi-
nance on its face, claiming the law violated club members' first amend-
ment rights of intimate and expressive association and fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection.1 5 The Supreme Court rejected
plaintiff's claim that the law was overbroad10 6 because the NYSCA failed
to "demonstrate from the text of the Law and from actual fact" that the
law threatened any particular club's "ability to associate together or to
advocate public or private viewpoints."' 17 The Court also rejected an
equal protection claim because no evidence indicated that benevolent or-
ders and religious corporations, which the law specifically exempted, had
the same business orientation as clubs subject to the antidiscrimination
provisions.108
The Court in New York State Club correctly deferred to New York
City's good faith effort to define the private club. New York's ordinance
reasonably focused on club size, exclusivity, and purpose-elements im-
portant to claims of associational rights.109 The law rationally provided
an exemption for benevolent orders and religious corporations, the prac-
102. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(a), 8-107(2) (1986). See New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at
2229 & n. 1, 2230; supra note 2.
103. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). See New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2229-30;
for the text of the amended law see supra note 2.
104. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). See New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
105. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2231. For a general discussion of problems of equal
protection challenges to private clubs, see supra note 65.
106. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2234-35. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, supra note 26, at 840-45 (discussion of the overbreadth doctrine).
107. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2234-35. Because the NYSCA failed to prove that in "a
substantial number of instances" the statute "threatens to undermine the [clubs'] associational or
expressive purposes," the Court could not find New York City's Human Rights Law "substantially
overbroad." Id.
108. Id. at 2235-37. The Court decided that strict scrutiny did not apply, and found a rational
basis for this legislative classification. Id. at 2235-37. It held the New York City Council reasonably
could have believed that the exempted organizations were different from the plaintiff club, based on
the noncommercial practice and purpose of these exempted clubs. Id. at 2236.
109. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
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tices and purposes of which differ from other private clubs."11 The ordi-
nance essentially operates as a rebuttable presumption of certain clubs'
public nature, leaving a purportedly private club the burden of proving
its status.1 1
B. Lower Courts Attempt to Define
Lower courts have had no greater success in articulating a standard for
private clubs. Given the Supreme Court's decisions in Roberts and Ro-
tary Club, lower courts understandably have utilized differing standards
in assessing private clubs' associational rights. Courts have looked to a
number of factors including size,112 membership selectivity,'13 formal
membership procedures, 1 4 degree of membership control over govern-
ance, 115 and history of the organization.' 1 6 Courts also have considered
use of club facilities by nonmembers, 117 substantiality of dues, 118 adver-
110. New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2236.
111. Id. at 2235. See infra note 161.
112. See, eg., Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1986)
(313,000 members); Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (E.D.
Mich. 1986) (membership "essentially unlimited" with more than 1,350,000 members nationally; 28
members in local club).
113. See, eg., Ridgewood Kiwanis, 806 F.2d at 475 ("to be subject to the prohibitions of the
statute, the organization or club must invite an unrestricted and unselected public to join as mem-
bers"); Rogers, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1479-80 (formal application procedure for screening applicants is
"cursory" and allows vast numbers of members); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.
3d 72, 81, 707 P.2d 212, 217, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (1985) (sole condition for use of recreational
facilities was that users be male); United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeals
Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (1983) (membership ex-
tended to all males who pass basic boating safety course).
114. See, e.g., Rogers, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (application procedure had only appearance of
being elaborate, formal, and structured); Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 412, 452 N.E.2d at 1204,
465 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (factor is whether club has permanent machinery established to screen appli-
cants carefully on any basis or no basis at all).
115. See, eg., Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 81, 707 P.2d 212, 218, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 156 (boys who
joined club had no control over its affairs or selecting membership); Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at
413, 452 N.E.2d at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (organization's relationship with federal and state
government boating safety officials not consonant with claim of being wholly private).
116. See, eg., Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1383 (D.N.J. 1986)
(Kiwanis limited membership to men since its inception in 1915).
117. See, eg., Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 81, 707 P.2d at 217, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (recreational
facilities generally open to all males in community); Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 413, 452 N.E.2d
at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (club encouraged and solicited public participation in their programs,
courses, and membership). But cf Ridgewood Kiwanis, 806 F. 2d at 474-75 (mere fact that club
meets in public restaurant does not render it "public accommodation").
118. See, eg., United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (Jaycees' annual
membership dues few dollars less for women associate members than regular members).
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tising,'" 9 purpose, 120 and predominance of a profit motive.12' Because
neither legislation nor the Supreme Court has identified the definitive pri-
vate club, courts must glean from other sources a framework for analysis.
C. Applying a Quantified Continuum to the Private Club
The private club escapes ready definition. While a bright-line test may
be unattainable, analysis of a private club should be quantified into a
four-factor test.
The four factors particularly crucial to the private club determination
are size, selectivity, exclusion of nonmembers, and purpose.'2 2  These
factors indicate the nature of the club's intimate and expressive associa-
tions and thus the constitutional protection to which the club is
entitled.' 23  The first three factors-size,' 24 selectivity,' 25 and exclusiv-
ity 120--measure the degree of intimate association involved. The last fac-
tor, purpose, demonstrates the club's need for expressive association
protection.' 27 This four-factor analysis should lay the groundwork for a
legislature to define, and courts to identify, the "distinctly private" club.
Legislatures and courts must assess all four factors, because no single
consideration is determinative of a club's private status.
119. See, eg., Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1480 (Lions engaged in intensive and continuous recruit-
ment of new members, and gave rewards and prizes for recruiting numbers of new members); Mc-
Clure, 305 N.W.2d at 769-70 (Jaycees recruitment manual refers to memberships as a product to be
sold); Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 413, 452 N.E.2d at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (club did not
direct publicity exclusively to members for their information and guidance).
120. See e.g., Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 88-89, 707 P.2d at 233, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (no evidence
that offering recreation only to boys serves primary purpose of combatting delinquency).
121. See, e-g., id. at 82, 83, 707 P.2d at 218, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (nonprofit); Power Squadrons,
59 N.Y.2d at 413, 452 N.E.2d at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (nonprofit).
122. The Supreme Court has considered these four factors as "critical aspects" of the associa-
tion's personal or private relationships. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620). District courts scrutinizing private clubs
have not adopted these factors exclusively. Courts continue to consider myriad other factors. See
supra notes 112-21. See also notes 76-78 and accompanying text (Louisiana public accommodations
law identifies nine factors).
123. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Brennan's sliding
scale of freedom of association.
124. See infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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1. Size
Size indicates the organization's degree of intimacy and selectivity. 12,8
Because the Supreme Court recognizes family relationships as exemplary
of protected intimate associations, 1 9 a court more likely may find a club
private if it functions as an extension of the living room, instead of the
board room.13 Thus, relative smallness demonstrates a private relation-
ship that warrants constitutional protection.131 Large clubs' claims of
private status are therefore unlikely to prove successful. 132 No magic
number, however, can dictate a club's private status. The Supreme
Court in New York State Club upheld a local statute that considered
private any club of up to 400 members.133 Nevertheless, the Rotary Club
Court found the Rotary Club, with local clubs having as few as twenty
members, not a private association entitled to constitutional
protection. 134
2. Selectivity
Selectivity is a crucial component of the private club. As with the
family, intimate organizations exercise a high degree of selectivity in the
decision to begin and end relationships. 35 "The essence of privacy is
selectivity. If there is little or no selectivity, there is no basis to claim
128. Selectivity is a separate factor in the analysis. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying
text. However, a large club may indicate a lack of selectivity.
129. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) (citing earlier Court
decisions recognizing the right of association in the family context) (citations omitted).
130. One court observed: "The clubhouse is of course not on the same constitutional plane as is
the bedroom or study." Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1195-96 (D. Conn. 1974) (three-judge court). "To have their privacy protected clubs must function
as extensions of members' homes and not as extensions of their businesses." Id. at 1204.
131. In the race context, courts have questioned the size of organizations claiming to be private
to escape coverage of the federal public accommodations law. In Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. 1182, a
court deemed private a club with more than 2 million members. But in Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F.
Supp. 1143 (D. Conn. 1970), a court rejected a club with fewer than 500 members as not private. In
both cases, the courts focused primarily on the clubs' membership practices.
132. In Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Mich. 1986), the
international organization revoked the club's charter following a local Lions Club's admission of a
woman. The local club and the woman sued under Michigan's civil rights statute. The court found
that, because the club had more than 1,350,000 members internationally, "the size of the local and
International Lions club is essentially unlimited." Id. at 1479. But see Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at
1203-04 (local lodge of Elks club with more than two million members held private Club in context
of race discrimination challenge).
133. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2229-30, 2235-37 (1988).
134. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).
135. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545-46.
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privacy." 136 States' definitions of the private club, therefore, in some way
should prescribe a standard for selectivity.
Various club practices might indicate the degree of selectivity: re-
cruitment of new members, 137 selection procedures, 138 and standards for
admission.' 39 Whether the club has established permanent machinery in
order carefully to screen applicants on any basis also serves to measure
selectivity.'" To fall within the definition of a private club, the club
must select members by using more than merely "perfunctory scru-
tiny.""'  Sex commonly does not serve as a legitimate criterion for mem-
bership; rather, it more likely indicates a pretext for discrimination.14 2
136. Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(citing Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968)); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305
N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 1981).
137. See, eg., Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1480.
138. Rotary International, for example, instructed its local clubs to "keep a flow of prospects
coming." Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546. The Jaycees' membership manual provided directions on
how to sell the "product" of a Jaycees membership. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 769.
139. The standards for admission must be more than a pretext for discrimination. See, e.g.,
United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d
1199, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983). Cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n., Inc., 410 U.S.
431, 438 (1973) (organization whose only selection criterion is race has "no plan or purpose of
exclusiveness" that might make it a private club exempt from federal civil rights statute) (quoting
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969)).
140. The court in United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d
401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983), held that organizations that routinely accept appli-
cants and place no subjective limits on the numbers of persons eligible for membership are not
private clubs. In Power Squadrons, any male, age 18 or over, who passed a basic boating course
received a membership invitation. Id. at 413, 452 N.E.2d at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877. The court
found that actual and potential membership was more public than private and there was no plan or
purpose of exclusivity other than sex discrimination. The club, therefore, was subject to the state's
Human Rights Law prohibiting sex discrimination. Id.
141. Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Mich. 1986). In
Rogers, the international organization revoked the charter of a local club after it admitted a woman.
The district court found that, while the organization's application procedure had "the appearance of
being elaborate, formal and structured," it was not selective. Id. at 1480. The international organi-
zation and the local club engaged in intensive recruitment of new members, gave rewards and prizes
for recruiting new members, and admitted virtually all male applicants who met minimal standards
for membership. "In short, the court finds that while the Lions are a club, they are a public club.
They have vast numbers of members, who are selected with only perfunctory scrutiny." Id. As a
"public club," the Lions did not come within the statutory exemption in the state civil rights law.
Id.
142. In New York State Club, the Court noted that selectivity means more than simply excluding
some persons on the basis of sex. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225,
2234 (1988). "[T]he Law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and other specified
characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate crite-
ria for determining membership." Id.
Single sex organizations, however, may be justified in certain circumstances. The club must
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3. Exclusion of Nonmembers
Those seeking protection of an intimate association must draw the
blinds to outsiders rather than keep their "windows and doors open to
the whole world."' 14 3 Thus, another key aspect of private status is that
the club excludes others from "critical aspects" of the membership.'" A
club's guest policy is one indicator of the degree of exclusion of nonmem-
bers. The Supreme Court in Rotary Club noted that because the Rotary
Club carried on many of its central activities in the presence of stran-
gers,145 the Court could not conclude that the state public accommoda-
tions law unduly interfered with any freedom of intimate association.146
Excluding not only nonmembers, but nonvoting members as well, may
be crucial to recognizing a protected intimate association. In Roberts,
demonstrate "that it is organized for specific purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its
desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the
same sex, for example, or the same religion." Id. at 2234. The Court went on to say that "it seems
sensible enough to believe that many of the large clubs covered by the law are not of this kind." Id.
Some have expressed concern that laws banning sex discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation will lead to such things as unisex bathrooms. This concern is easily set aside because the
purpose of such facilities justifies single-sex admission. However, some states have safeguarded
unisex public restrooms through express language in their public accommodations laws. See, eg.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 103 (Smith-Hurd 1989) ("Nothing in this Article shall apply to...
[a]ny facility, as to discrimination based on sex, which is distinctly private in nature such as
restrooms, shower rooms, bath houses, health clubs and other similar facilities."); IND. CODE § 22-
9-2(p)(1) (1986) ("It shall not be a discriminatory practice to maintain separate restrooms."); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(c)(1) (1986) (discrimination prohibited "except where a distinction because
of sex is necessary because of the intrinsic nature of such accommodation"); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.146 (West Supp. 1989) ("Rooming facilities at educational, religious, charitable or non-
profit institutions or organizations, and restrooms and locker room facilities in places of public ac-
commodation may be separated according to sex.")
143. Rotary Clubs, "rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to
keep their 'windows and doors open to the whole world.'" Board of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987) (quoting ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, Focus ON ROTARY
60-61 app. 85 (1981)).
144. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). "As a general matter, only
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an
understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty." Id.
A club's preventing access to the general public may indicate that it is distinctly private. In Power
Squadrons, the court found the club encouraged and solicited public participation in its boating
safety programs. 59 N.Y.2d at 413, 452 N.E.2d at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877. That the club did not
direct its publicity solely to its members for their information and guidance indicated the Power
Squadrons was not a "distinctly private club." Id.
145. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 547. Local Rotary clubs were required to admit any member of
any other Rotary club to their meetings. Members were encouraged to bring business associates and
competitors to meetings. The national organization encouraged clubs to seek newspaper coverage of
their meetings and activities. Id.
146. Id.
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the Jaycees prohibited women from voting or holding office but allowed
them to hold associate memberships, attend various meetings, participate
in select projects, and engage in many of the organization's social func-
tions.1 47 The Court found that "much of the activity central to the for-
mation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of
strangers to that relationship." '148 The Court concluded that "the
Jaycees chapters lack[ed] the distinctive characteristics that might afford
constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude
women." 
14 9
Payment by nonmembers may reveal that the club fails to exclude out-
siders and thereby fails to meet private status. In New York State Club,
the Court upheld a statute that looked to whether the club regularly re-
ceived payment-directly or indirectly-from nonmembers for dues,
fees, use of space, facilities, meals, or beverages.1 50 Receipt of such pay-
ment indicated the nonexclusive nature of such clubs and thereby
removed clubs from the private club exemption of the city's antidis-
crimination law.15 1
4. Purpose
A club's purpose also may suggest its private or public character.152
The Supreme Court has recognized that a closed membership may be
necessary to carry out certain political, social, educational, religious and
cultural ends. 53 In Roberts, the Court considered the extent to which
the Jaycees' activities may constitute protected expression on political,
economic, cultural, and social affairs. 54 It decided that the admission of
women would not hamper the Jaycees' message, particularly because wo-
147. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13, 621.
148. Id. at 621.
149. Id.
150. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988).
151. Id.
152. Clubs with the goal of providing public service are not likely to be found private. In Rogers
v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1986), the court looked
to the Lions' active provision of numerous community and humanitarian services. Additionally, the
court considered the private benefits to Lions members of leadership skills and useful business con-
tacts, concluding that the Lions Clubs were "public in terms of the services they provide to others
and to their members." Id. See also United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Ap-
peals Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 877 (1983) (purpose of
boating safety through education led to finding club public).
153. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
154. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
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men already attended meetings and participated in the organization as
associate members.1 55
Renting out club facilities and providing meal service may also negate
claims of private club status. Providing meal and beverage service may
indicate a nonexpressive, commercial purpose and thus remove the club
from the realm of constitutional protection.56
D. Proposal for Defining the "Private Club"
The private club escapes easy definition. Although a club's size, selec-
tivity, exclusivity and purpose plainly are important factors, these stan-
dards may vary on a case-by-case basis so that they will not allow
consistent predictions of what would constitute a private club.157 Each
factor is so malleable under any particular circumstance that the ele-
ments fail to operate individually or as a group to provide a bright-line
test. The Supreme Court has avoided establishing plain guidelines and
instead has deferred to states' attempts to do so.158 Because the constitu-
tional line is difficult-or perhaps impossible-to draw, the Court likely
will treat with some deference states' good faith efforts to demarcate the
border.
States, therefore, must actively provide guidelines for defining the pri-
vate club. New York City's Human Rights Law serves as a starting
point for fashioning legislation."5 9 States should incorporate this Note's
four-factor analysis" ° to create a rebuttable presumption.61 that clubs
meeting its criteria are not distinctly private. This analysis strikes a bal-
155. Id. at 627. Similarly, in Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 470 (3d
Cir. 1986), a court found that "[n]either the goals nor the activities of the organization are sex-
specific." The primary function of the organization was to perform charitable service in the commu-
nity. Promoting camaraderie among its members was a secondary goal. The court found neither
objective would be hampered by the admission of women. Id. Nonetheless, based on the club's
selectivity in membership, the court of appeals determined the Kiwanis was not a place of public
accommodation and reversed the trial court, which had concluded that the club must comply with
the state's antidiscrimination law. Id. at 478.
156. See New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2233 (1988).
157. See generally supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 88, 99, 109 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 2.
160. See supra notes 122-56 and accompanying text.
161. In applying the federal public accommodations law, see supra note 8, courts have held that
clubs bear the burden of proving their private status so as to be exempt from the act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.
1968); Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd sub nom, Daniel v. Paul, 395 F.2d
118 (8th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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ance between the important interests of the right to choose one's own
associates and the right to be free from discrimination.'
62
States' discretion, however, is not necessarily limitless. First, state
laws still may infringe inappropriately on first amendment rights. 163 One
such infringement would be a sex discrimination law that provides no
exemption for private associations. The New York City law avoided this
pitfall explicitly by exempting certain types of clubs, as well as benevo-
lent orders and religious organizations.'" Second, states may draw a line
that is too bright. For example, the San Francisco ordinance, unlike the
New York law,'65 does not give clubs an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption of being a public club.' 66
The Supreme Court should defer to states' judgments of what consti-
tutes a private club, provided states stay within these relatively simple
boundaries.' 67 This deference to states in an area of first amendment
rights is unusual, but appropriate. In the first amendment context, the
Court typically does not defer to state judgment. 68 Here, however, be-
cause of the clash between the right to speech and society's interest in
eradicating discrimination, the Court should allow states to perform
their own good faith line-drawing to advance the compelling interest of
eradicating discrimination. 69
IV. CONCLUSION
The New York State Club decision suggests that large, business-ori-
ented private clubs represent more an extension of the board room than
the living room. More than a friendly bridge game, these clubs shuffle
162. See supra notes 14-55 and accompanying text.
163. A state law may not be valid if there are significantly less restrictive means to achieve its
compelling state interest. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; supra notes 41-42.
164. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in New York State Club
found the New York City Council reasonably could have believed that benevolent orders and reli-
gious corporations were different from other purportedly private clubs in the crucial respect of
whether business activity is prevalent among them. 108 S. Ct. at 2235-37. Additionally, the Court
stated that the New York law indicates that benevolent orders and religious corporations are unique
and that a rational basis existed for this exemption. Id. at 2236.
165. See New York State Club, 108 S. Ct. at 2235; University Club v. City of New York, 842
F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1988); Local Law No. 63 of 1984 § I, App. 14-15.
166. See Kay, supra note 15, at 857. Courts may find such a hard line too uncompromising to
survive a first amendment overbreadth challenge.
167. See supra notes 88, 99, 109 and accompanying text.
168. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 26, at 19-20.
169. See supra notes 7, 14 and accompanying text.
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deals among the country's most powerful political, business, and finan-
cial leaders. The New York State Club Court did not strip individuals of
their first amendment right to choose their associates for expressive and
intimate purposes. Rather, the court protected the state's right to pre-
vent exclusion of individuals from business associations because of irrele-
vant considerations such as sex. The decision, however, left the right of
freedom of association for truly private clubs unscathed.
The remaining question involves defining the parameters of the private
club. The New York State Club opinion suggests that the Court is willing
to defer to states' good faith efforts to draw these lines. The case thus
invites states to enact legislation banning sex discrimination by private
clubs.
New York City took a step in the right direction by prohibiting invidi-
ous discrimination in purportedly private clubs. States should follow this
direction by outlawing sex discrimination in public clubs and creating a
rebuttable presumption that clubs are public unless they can show by
their size, selectivity, exclusion of nonmembers, and purpose that they
are private. States must not allow clubs to wrap themselves in a cloak of
privacy to shield their discriminatory practices.
Paula J. Finlay
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